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Executive compensation is a constant work in progress, influenced by the ebb and flow of 
corporate and financial crises, political agendas, and academic and popular 
commentary. Against the background of a flurry of new provisions, this article begins by 
taking a step back and provides a high-level perspective on the fundamental issues and 
drivers of the contemporary executive compensation debate. Building upon this basis, the 
article then moves to explore the rules on executive remuneration in the UK, looking first 
at earlier approaches before shifting to a more detailed exploration of the most recent 
reforms. The article concludes with a critical analysis of the current framework and, 
more generally, the merits of regulating executive compensation. It suggests that it is 
unclear whether executive compensation has correctly been identified as a field for 
regulatory intervention, and, if there is such a case, that the UK’s latest measures are 
insufficient to address the problem. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Executive compensation (or “remuneration”) is one of the most widely discussed – and most 
controversial – corporate governance issues of recent times. It has become the most visible sign 
of an ongoing international trend to strengthen “shareholder democracy”1 as evidenced by 
shareholders regaining certain decision-making powers from company boards. Executive 
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1
  For instance, in 2003, the EU identified the establishment of “real shareholder democracy” as one if its medium to 
long-term political goals. European Commission, “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward” COM(2003) 284, 14. 
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compensation is also closely related to other hot-button issues, short-termism and risk-taking, 
which have remained at the forefront of corporate governance debates since the last financial 
crisis.
2
 
  The UK has long been a leader in the regulation of executive compensation, pioneering, 
among others, “say on pay”, that is shareholder votes relating to this matter. However, numerous 
other jurisdictions – in Europe and elsewhere – have increasingly followed or even surpassed its 
lead. For example, even the US, with its traditionally strong focus on business friendly corporate 
laws, has introduced say on pay, while certain European jurisdictions already have binding 
shareholders votes on executive pay and have introduced or attempted to introduce salary caps 
and executive-employee pay ratios.
3
  
 This article, however, takes for the most part a narrower view, focusing mainly on the UK’s 
general executive compensation regime.
4
 First, the article provides a brief introductory overview 
of the main issues that surround the executive pay debate. On this basis, the article goes on to 
outline the regulation of executive remuneration in the UK, from tracing earlier approaches to 
discussing the most recent reforms, which have entered into force in late 2013. Finally, the 
 
 
2
  See “Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision-Making” (July 2012) (“Kay Review”). 
3
  For recent overviews, see Hay Group, “Executive reward snapshot: more shareholders are getting a say on top 
pay” (2013) <http://www.haygroup.com/downloads/ww/HG280_Say%20on%20Pay_v05.pdf> accessed on 12 
September 2014; Towers Watson, “Executive Remuneration: European Corporate Governance Developments” 
(2013) < http://www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media={4943B8FF-1E4A-4129-8E95-
79E30BBC9824}> accessed on 12 September 2014. Moreover, note that the EU is currently considering 
introducing harmonized executive remuneration rules. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU’ COM(2014) 213 final. These rules would 
be implemented in addition to already existing EU remuneration rules for financial institutions, for further 
background and analysis on which see E Ferran, “New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector” (2012) 
9 European Company and Financial Law Review 1. 
4
 The discussion will not extend to requirements that apply solely to the banking and financial industry. 
UK Executive Compensation 
 
3 
article concludes with a reflective analysis of the revised UK framework, providing a critical 
analysis of the latest reforms’ potential impact and merits. 
B. THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DEBATE 
1. The Problem 
 
 There is no doubt that executives of large public companies receive substantial and 
continuously increasing remuneration packages. The average total pay of FTSE 100 Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) for the period from 1998–2010 has risen 13.6% per year from an 
average of £1 million to £4.2 million, far outpacing the 1.7% average annual increase in the 
FTSE 100 index and average remuneration levels for other employees for the same period.
5
 
More recently, in 2011, the median increase in total remuneration awarded for CEOs in 
FTSE 100 companies amounted to 10%, following a 13% increase in 2010. In addition, during 
the same year, half of the FTSE 100 CEOs were awarded increases of more than 10%, with one 
quarter receiving increases in total remuneration of 41% or more.
6
  
 Yet, it is clear that executive remuneration is controversial not just based on the high 
amounts or increases of remuneration packages. One of the most frequently cited concerns is 
that there is a lack of alignment between executive pay and company share performance. 
Nevertheless, for the UK, empirical data only provides partial support for this thesis. Several 
 
 
5
 Department for Business Innovation and Skills (“BIS”), “Executive remuneration discussion paper” (2011) 11 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31660/11-1287-executive-
remuneration-discussion-paper.pdf> accessed 17 September 2014.  
6
 Manifest, “Executive Pay – Where Are We Now?”(2012) <http://www.mm-k.com/content/documents/Executive-
Summary.pdf>; see also B Groom, “Gap widens between UK executive pay and results”, Financial Times, 23 
January 2014 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92a3db66-835b-11e3-aa65-00144feab7de.html#axzz2u5gCboqv> 
accessed 17 September 2014. 
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studies confirmed a relation between pay and performance but also identified an asymmetric 
relationship between them. While performance and executive pay were linked, a stronger 
relationship was detected between pay and strong performance than between pay and weak 
performance.
7
 However, company underperformance was also linked to a significant increase in 
the probability of CEOs losing their jobs.
8
 Moreover, most recently, yet another study concluded 
that pay and performance are more strongly aligned than previously thought.
9
 
 Apart from concerns related to performance, executive pay is often compared to 
compensation received by other employees. During 1998–2010, UK employee remuneration has 
only grown by 4.7%, lifting the multiple of CEO pay from 47 times average worker pay to a 
multiple of 120.
10
 Thus, in addition to the size of pay and performance questions, there is an 
added issue that touches upon employee incentives and productivity, leading to complicated 
broader societal issues of distributive justice and fairness.
11
 
 Nevertheless, whether these developments alone should be the basis for regulatory 
intervention is not self-evident. Many investment bankers, hedge fund and private equity fund 
 
 
7
 P Gregg et al, “Executive Pay and Performance in the UK” (2010), AXA Working Article Series No 5, Discussion 
Article No 657 
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/DP657_2010_ExecutivePayandPerformanceintheUK.
pdf> accessed 17 September 2014; B Bell and J van Reenan, “Firm Performance and Wages: Evidence from Across 
the Corporate Hierarchy” (2011) 
<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/conference_papers/04_11_2011/BellVReenen_FirmPerformanceandWages.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2014. See also I Gregory-Smith and B May, “Heads I win, Tails you lose? A career analysis of 
executive pay and corporate performance” (2012) University of Edinburgh Research Article 
<http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/images/Heads%20I%20win_Dec_2012.pdf> accessed 17 September 2014. 
8
 Bell and van Reenan, supra n 7, 22. 
9
 B Bell and J van Reenan, “Extreme Wage Inequality: Pay at the Very Top” (2013) Centre for Economic 
Performance, Occasional Article No 34 <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/occasional/op034.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2014. The study also found that the link is stronger and more symmetric for companies in which 
institutional investors play a larger role. 
10
 BIS, supra n 6, 11. 
11
 See Charlotte Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice?” (2010) 10 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 309. 
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managers, athletes, actors, and other celebrities receive compensation that dwarfs pay levels of 
executives, often without any public questioning about linkages with performance. For example, 
footballer Wayne Rooney’s yearly salary – still on the lower end compared to some other 
individuals in the public eye – has been reported as £15.6 million.12 While the exact multiple 
between his pay and some of his current employer Manchester United’s other employees, such 
as physical therapists or administrative staff, is unknown, his pay is more than three times 
higher than the 2012 average pay of a FTSE 100 executive director.
13
 Yet, these realities have 
not stirred substantial concerns nor triggered governmental regulation of non-executive pay.  
 One possible explanation why executives of quoted companies are being singled out is that 
they work for companies that involve broad public investment, either directly through individual 
shareholdings or indirectly via institutional investors such as pension schemes. However, this 
does not explain the case of footballers such as Wayne Rooney, who is employed by Manchester 
United plc, a public company that is – like various other football clubs – listed on a stock 
exchange. Nevertheless, executive remuneration and performance is perhaps more easily 
measurable and, in addition, executives do not normally benefit from public sympathies and 
emotional attachment that can be observed with celebrities in sports and other fields. 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 G Rose, “Wayne Rooney: Manchester United’s forward’s £70m deal”, BBC Sport, 21 February 2014 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/26246939> accessed 17 September 2014. 
13
 J Treanor and S Neville, “Executive pay among FTSE firms keeps soaring” The Guardian, 11 June 2012 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jun/11/executive-pay-soars-survey-shows> accessed 17 September 
2014. 
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2. The Agency Cost Approach 
 In the corporate governance literature, executive pay is routinely analysed by drawing from 
agency theory.
14
 Shareholders, as principals, delegate the bulk of the management of their 
companies to directors and managers, who act as agents, giving up considerable amounts of 
control and information in the process. This situation, in turn, enables the agents to act in their 
own self-interest, diverting benefits to themselves to a degree that is not justified in view of a 
company’s long-term success. Both pay levels and design of remuneration packages are seen as 
potentially affected by these agency costs and a sign of diverging shareholder and managerial 
interests. Specifically, pay levels can be insufficiently linked to firm performance, resulting in 
“excessive” or inefficiently high rewards relative to performance. In addition, remuneration 
packages that over-emphasize short term results can lead executives to neglect long-term value 
maximization and even contribute to manipulated financial results.
15
  
 Following the logic of agency theory, initiatives to influence executive pay are often framed 
as agency cost-reducing measures, aiming to shift back control to shareholders. Implicit in this 
approach is the assumption that remuneration awards in companies are tainted by conflicts of 
interest or are evidence of insufficient board oversight. According to this view, executives have 
captured the directors who set their pay, using their influence to successfully demand ever-
increasing compensation. Seen this way, the only remaining restraint is the threat of negative 
 
 
14
 See generally M C Jensen and W H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Capital Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
15
 The most complete account in this respect is provided in L Bebchuk and J Fried, Pay Without Performance: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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perceptions by outsiders, which in turn leads companies to attempt to hide details of the level 
and performance-sensitivity of executive compensation.
16
  
 Other commentators, however, refute the notion that managerial power extends to their own 
remuneration. From this perspective, remuneration setting policy is largely free from conflicts of 
interest and subject to market-based “arms-length” negotiation.17 Alternatively, those sceptical 
of government regulation of executive pay suggest that the way forward should lie in “light 
touch” reforms that are “limited, targeted and [do] not distort boards’ ability to design effective 
and innovative pay packages and the complexities of pay design”.18  
 While the situation in the UK and the US is not directly comparable, it is worth noting that 
there are several US studies suggesting that pay and performance are mostly aligned.
19
 There is 
also some support for the proposition that compensation practices are set with shareholder 
interests in mind and evidence that pay increases can be explained with increased firm size and 
complexity.
20
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
 ibid. 
17
 S M Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 
116–118. 
18
 G Ferrarini et al, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe” (2010) 10 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 73, 111. 
19
 See, eg S N Kaplan, “Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and 
Challenges” 2012 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8. 
20
 See X Gabaix et al, “CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis” (2014) 124 Economic Journal 40; 
Bainbridge, supra n 17, 117-8 (citing additional studies). 
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C. THE UK RULES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
1. Best Practices and Statutory Law 
 
 The UK has long struggled with executive pay compensation. There has been a long-
standing movement, driven both by private and governmental initiatives, towards reducing 
perceived agency costs and market failures in this area.
21
 Contemporary regulatory efforts can 
be traced back to the last two decades of the last century, when executive compensation rose 
quickly through both periods of economic expansion and contraction and executives benefited 
from large pay increases, particularly in recently privatized utilities, sometimes coinciding with 
worsening conditions for staff and consumers.
22
 As a result, investor and public concerns about 
misalignments between executive compensation and performance surfaced, with some 
underperforming companies being perceived to be handing out “rewards for failure.” 
 Against this background, and further spurred by threatened Government action, a number of 
important corporate governance initiatives emerged. Relating to remuneration, the most notable 
among these is the industry-led Greenbury Report, published in 1995. Building further on 
principles developed in the landmark 1992 Cadbury Report,
23
 the Greenbury Report proposed a 
new code of voluntary best practices for directorial pay for listed UK companies.
24
 
 
 
21
 See, eg BIS, supra n 5. 
22
 A Dignam, “Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate-Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement” 
(2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 401, 408. 
23
 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, “Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance” (December 1992). 
24
 See “Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury” (1995) (“Greenbury 
Report”). Although the Report’s focus was mainly on directors and large companies, it also noted that its principles 
would in large part apply equally to other senior executives and as smaller companies. 
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 The Greenbury Report’s basic premise was simple: Companies should “provide the 
packages needed to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required” while, at the 
same time, “avoid paying more than is necessary for the purpose”.25 In support thereof, the 
Report recommended that remuneration committees, comprised of non-executive directors, 
should be put in charge of setting remuneration, emphasizing that performance-related pay 
elements should be carefully designed to align directors’ and shareholders’ interests.26 The 
Report further proposed disclosure mechanisms and obligations beyond what was already 
required by statute.
27
 Moreover, adopting a voluntary form of say-on-pay, the Report suggested 
that shareholders should be given the opportunity to approve remuneration policies at any 
general meeting where the board decided that such a vote would be appropriate.
28
 Moreover, 
companies were invited to present long-term incentive schemes available to directors and senior 
executives to their shareholders with a view to an advisory vote to secure their approval.
29
 
2. The 2002 Regulations 
 
 Subsequently, many of the Greenbury Report’s key recommendations were incorporated in 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, now the UK Corporate Governance Code, which 
applies to listed companies and is published under the auspices of the Financial Reporting 
 
 
25
 ibid, section C1, paras 6.5–6.7. 
26
 ibid, sections C and D.  
27
 Companies were to provide shareholders annually with comprehensive information regarding their executive 
directors’ remuneration policy and the entire remuneration packages of individual directors. See ibid, section B 2 
and paras 5.3–5.12. At the time, the Companies Act 1985 mandated that, among others, a company disclose the 
aggregate compensation paid to directors during the relevant year as well as details of compensation paid to the 
highest paid member of the board. 
28
 Greenbury Report, supra n 24, paras 5.28–5.32. 
29
 ibid, para 5.33. 
UK Executive Compensation 
 
10 
Council.
30
 However, apart from mandatory specific disclosure and shareholder approval 
requirements incorporated in the Listing Rules,
31
 which also adopted the Greenbury Report’s 
major recommendations, remuneration best practices remained largely just that: non-binding 
soft law that was subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code’s comply-or-explain 
framework. Companies were free to adhere to these practices or explain why they have not. 
 Yet, the best practice approach to executive compensation did not yield the desired results. 
Remuneration disclosure remained often vague, lacking the detailed information necessary to 
make an informed assessment, including clarity about the relationship between rewards and 
performance. Moreover, remuneration committees continued to include non-independent 
members. Finally, only a small number of companies chose to give their shareholders a vote on 
remuneration reports, despite shareholder concerns relating to executive compensation.
32
  
 In view of low levels of compliance, combined with renewed scrutiny of executive pay 
levels in the wake of the late 1990s bull market, the Government decided to take action. The 
Department for Business Innovation & Skills
33
 issued the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations 2002, elevating directors’ remuneration provisions to statutory level.34  
 
 
30
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2014). 
31
 On which, see supra n 35 below. 
32
 See Department of Trade and Industry, “Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document” (1999) Chapter 2 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/payfinal.pdf> accessed 17 September 
2014; see also Villiers, supra n 11, 317-8. 
33
 At that time still known as the Department for Trade and Industry. 
34
 Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/1986) (‘2002 Regulations’), amending the 
Companies Act 1985. 
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 The 2002 Regulations, creating a partial overlap with pre-existing Listing Rules 
requirements,
35
 made it mandatory for quoted companies incorporated in Great Britain to 
prepare for each financial year a directors’ remuneration report.36  In essence, in addition to 
details on the remuneration committee’s role and membership, the report had to contain a 
detailed explanation of a company’s policy on directors’ remuneration, including a summary of 
any performance condition with regards to entitlements to share options or under a long-term 
incentive scheme, notice periods, termination arrangements, details as to service contracts with 
directors, the specific remuneration of each individual director over the most recent financial 
year, and significant payments to former directors.
37
 At every annual general meeting, 
shareholders had to be given the opportunity to pass a non-binding say-on-pay resolution, 
indicating whether or not they approved the directors’ remuneration report.38 Thus, the board’s 
former discretion with regards to holding this vote was replaced with a positive obligation to 
give shareholders the right to periodically voice their opinion on directors’ compensation.  
 Looking back after more than a decade after introduction of the 2002 Regulations, their 
success appears highly questionable. Commentators noted that the combined system of 
mandatory disclosure and advisory vote, coupled with reliance on remuneration committees, has 
not succeeded in curbing rising pay levels and had little effect on the alignment of compensation 
 
 
35
 In its most recent incarnation (before changes that took effect in December 2013), Rule 9.8.8 R of the UK Listing 
Rules contained a requirement for UK incorporated companies with a premium listing on the London Stock 
Exchange to disclose their remuneration policy and information on each director’s pay. This rule was recently 
amended in order to avoid overlap with the 2013 executive compensation reforms (on which, see section B 3 
below). Moreover, Rule 9.4 still requires that shareholders of companies with premium listings approve directors’ 
long-term incentive schemes. 
36
 Today, section 420 of the Companies Act 2006 contains boards’ statutory obligations in this regard. 
37
 2002 Regulations, Schedule 7A. Additionally, Companies Act 2006, ss 215-22 mandate shareholder approval for 
certain payments for directors’ loss of office. 
38
 2002 Regulations, s 7; Companies Act 2006, s 439. 
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and performance.
39
 On the contrary, broadened disclosure of compensation levels is sometimes 
thought to have led to increases in executive compensation and legitimized excessive pay.
40
  
 Notably, UK shareholders have rarely voiced their displeasure with remuneration policies, 
engaging mostly in rare and extreme cases. Only recently, in the 2012 “shareholder spring” 
annual general meeting cycle were shareholders more actively in using their advisory vote 
against directors’ remuneration. However, even during this time, average levels of dissent were 
at 11.7%, up from 9.6% in 2011 and down from the peak of 16% in 2002.
41
 Moreover, 
companies that saw negative votes tended to be smaller companies and typically involved 
shareholders targeting executives perceived not to act in the best interests of shareholders for 
reasons other than their pay levels.
42
  
 In line with these observations, empirical studies on the effects of say on pay tend to 
paint a neutral to cautiously positive picture. A leading examination of say on pay in the UK 
between 2000–2005 suggested that shareholder votes had no impact on the level and growth of 
average CEO pay but found that it influenced underperforming companies with controversial 
pay practices (such as generous severance payments) or unusually high executive 
remuneration.
43
 Recent examinations of the impact of say on pay in the US yielded similar 
results, finding no effect on the level or composition of CEO pay but suggesting that these votes 
 
 
39
 See Dignam, supra n 18, 411-2; Villiers, supra n 11, 319-23; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes 
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in” (2009) Harvard Journal on Legislation 323. 
40
 Dignam, supra n 18; see also B E Hermalin and M S Weisbach, “Information Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance” (2012) 67 Journal of Finance 195. 
41
 Dignam, supra n 18, 436. 
42
 ibid, 435. 
43
 F and D A Maber, “Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK” (2011) 
<http://articles.ssrn.com/sol3/articles.cfm?abstract_id=1420394> accessed 10 September 2014. 
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are sensitive, among others, to excessive CEO compensation and financial performance.
44
 One 
study also found that boards react to rejection votes by subsequently reducing abnormal pay 
levels.
45
 Thus, say on pay does not appear to have an effect on pay levels overall, but seems to be 
able to address excesses at individual firms with problematic corporate governance practices.  
 
3. The 2013 Reforms 
 
 The skeptical views of previous regimes regulating remuneration are shared by the UK 
Government. Long critical of executive pay practices, this stance was likely reinforced by the 
near collapse of the financial industry during the last financial crisis and subsequent corporate 
governance reports that suggested a connection between the crisis, risk-taking, and executive 
pay practices.
46
 Thus, citing “compelling evidence of a disconnect between pay and 
performance in large UK listed companies,” unstainable “ratcheting-up of executive pay,” and 
overly lengthy and complex remuneration disclosure documents, the Government initiated more 
stringent legislative action.
47
 
 
 
44
 P Iliev and S Vitanova, “The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the U.S.” (2013) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235064> accessed 10 September 2014. 
45
 M B Kimbro and D Xu, “Shareholders have a Say on Executive Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the 
United States” (2013) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209936> accessed 10 September 2014. A recent broad cross-
country study also yielded positive results, suggesting that say on pay is associated with a lower level of CEO 
compensation, resulting partly from lower compensation growth rates, higher performance sensitivity, and higher 
firm value. R Correa and U Lel, “Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, CEO Play Slice, and Firm Value 
around the World” (2013) International Finance Discussion Article 
<http://articles.ssrn.com/sol3/articles.cfm?abstract_id=2243921> accessed 10 September 2014. 
46
 See D Walker (Walker Review), “A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities: Final Recommendations” (2009). 
47
 BIS, “Directors’ Pay: Consultation on revised remuneration reporting regulations” (2012) Foreword from the 
Secretary of State and section 1 (Background) 
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(a) Overview 
 
 Following lengthy discussion and consultations, a new framework, which applies to UK 
incorporated quoted companies,
48
 came into force effective as of October 1, 2013. Its goals are 
four-fold: to restore a stronger, clearer link between pay and performance; to reduce rewards for 
failure; to promote better engagement between companies and shareholders; and to empower 
shareholders to hold companies accountable through binding votes.
49
  
 The 2013 reforms aim to achieve these goals by using a two-tiered approach.
50
 First, the new 
rules require at least once every three years a binding shareholder vote on a company’s general 
policy for annual directorial remuneration.
51
 Second, companies are required to hold an annual, 
non-binding advisory vote by shareholders on the company’s ongoing implementation of its 
directorial remuneration policy, as reported on by the board at the end of each year.
52
 Moreover, 
increased shareholder participation is combined with greater corporate remuneration disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                            
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31358/12-888-directors-pay-
consultation-remuneration-reporting.pdf> accessed 17 September 2014. 
48
 These are companies whose equity share capital is included in the Financial Conduct Authority’s official list (that 
is not Alternative Investment Market listed companies) or is officially listed in another state in the European 
Economic Area or is admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. Overseas 
companies are not included in the scope of the new provisions but, if they have a premium listing on the London 
Stock Exchange, still have to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code – including its section D on 
Remuneration – or explain non-compliance; see Listing Rules 9.8.7 and 9.8.6R (5)-(6). 
49
 BIS, supra n 47, Foreword from the Secretary of State. 
50
 See, generally, The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Amendment 
Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1981) (‘2013 Regulations’), revoking and replacing Schedule 8 of the Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008; Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (2013/240), 
amending the Companies Act 2006.  
51
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 79(4), amending the Companies Act 2006 by inserting a new 
section 439A (Quoted companies: members’ approval of directors’ remuneration policy). 
52
 See ibid, s 79(3), amending Companies Act 2006, s 439. 
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requirements and civil consequences for those who authorize and receive unapproved 
payments.
53
 
(b) The Three-Part Directors’ Remuneration Report 
 
 In line with the new framework’s bi-furcated approach, a company’s reporting on 
remuneration needs to be divided in distinct parts, two of which are – at different intervals – 
subject to a shareholder vote. A company’s directors’ remuneration report for a financial year 
must consist of (1) the annual statement; (2) the annual report on remuneration; and (3) the 
directors’ remuneration policy.54  
 The first part of the directors’ remuneration report is the annual statement, a personal 
reflection by the chair of the remuneration committee or, if there is no such person, another 
director nominated by the board to make the statement. The annual statement summarizes for 
the relevant financial year the major decisions on directors’ remuneration and substantial 
changes relating to directors’ remuneration made during the past year. The annual statement 
should also include the context in which those changes have occurred and decisions that have 
been taken.
55
 The statement gives chairmen and their companies the opportunity to provide 
context and set the tone for the remainder of the directors’ remuneration report. 
 
 
53
 The provisions apply to ‘directors’ in general, although companies may make distinctions between executive and 
non-executive directors and taking into account that some requirements may not be applicable in relation to non-
executive directors; see 2013 Regulations, supra n 50, ss 2(3)–(4). 
54
 The directors’ remuneration policy may be omitted from the overall directors’ remuneration report if the 
company does not intend and is not required to seek approval for it in a given financial year; see Companies Act 
2006, s 439A (as amended). 
55
 2013 Regulations, supra n 50, Schedule 8, s 3. 
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 The second part of the remuneration report consists of the annual report on remuneration, 
which includes an account as to how the directors’ remuneration policy has been implemented 
in view of the payments made to directors. As previously mandated, shareholders continue to 
have an annual advisory vote on this section of the directors’ remuneration report.56 Since it is 
advisory only, the vote’s outcome will not affect the validity of any remuneration paid to 
directors. The purpose of this vote is solely to give shareholders an opportunity to signal 
whether they are content with a company’s application of their remuneration policy. 
 In terms of disclosure, the key innovation in this part is that it has to include a single total 
remuneration figure for every director for the current and preceding financial year, presented in 
the form of a table and broken down into salary and fees, benefits, money or assets received or 
receivable as a result of the achievement of performance measures or targets, pension related 
benefits, bonus, and earnings from any long-term incentive scheme.
57
 Moreover, the report must 
show for each director total pension entitlements, scheme interests (such as those relating to 
shares and options) awarded during the financial year, payments to past directors, payments for 
loss of office, and an outline of directors’ shareholding and share interests in the company.58 
 Contrary to what the Government had initially proposed, there is no new prerequisite to 
compare performance directly with CEO pay. A proposal to this effect was modified in light of 
comments received. Instead, the annual report on remuneration has to contain a graph 
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comparing the company’s share performance to a broader index (consistent with previous 
regulations) and a novel CEO remuneration table that compares, for a period up to ten years, 
annual changes with respect to total remuneration, and measures annual bonus awards and long-
term incentive vesting rates against the maximum opportunity that could have been achieved.
59
  
 However, the annual remuneration report addresses the growing pay gap between executives 
and ordinary employees. Companies now have to produce a table that indicates (i) the 
percentage change in respect of the CEO’s salary and fees, taxable benefits, and annual bonus as 
compared to the preceding financial year and (ii) the percentage change of these amounts as 
compared to the preceding financial year in respect of the employees of the company – or 
employees of the group, in case of the CEO of a parent company – taken as a whole.60 
 The annual remuneration report must also contain a graph or table that outlines the actual 
expenditure of the company, and the difference in spend between those years, on remuneration 
paid to or receivable by all employees of the group, distributions to shareholders by way of 
dividend and share buyback, and any other significant distributions and payments.
61
 Finally, the 
company must report on how it intends to implement the approved directors’ remuneration 
policy in the following financial year.
62
  
 The third part of the remuneration report is the directors’ remuneration policy. This part is 
subject to the new requirement that companies obtain binding shareholder approval. 
Shareholders get to vote on the directors’ remuneration policy at the annual general meeting 
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held in the company’s first financial year to begin on or after October 1, 2013.63 Thereafter, the 
policy must be proposed for shareholder approval at least every three years, or sooner if the 
company wishes to amend the policy.
64
  
 If at an annual general meeting the advisory vote on the second part of the remuneration 
report, the implementation report, is not approved, the company will be required to put forward 
its remuneration policy for approval at the following year’s annual general meeting or a meeting 
convened specifically for the purpose of gaining approval. Alternatively, it may operate 
according to the last approved remuneration policy and, if it deems necessary, seek separate 
shareholder approval for any specific payments that are inconsistent with the approved policy. 
 Substantively, the directors’ remuneration policy has to set out the policy of the company 
with respect to the making of directorial remuneration payments and payments for loss of office. 
Among others, it has to include a future policy table that describes the components of the 
remuneration package for the directors, the company’s approach to remuneration for director 
appointments in the future, a description of obligations contained in existing and future service 
contracts, forward-looking illustrations of each directors’ pay under the directors’ remuneration 
policy in the first year after its adoption, and the policy on payments for loss of office.
65
 This 
part must also include a statement on how pay and employment conditions of employees other 
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than directors of the company (or group) were taken into account in setting the policy for 
directors’ remuneration as well as a statement of consideration of shareholder views.66  
(c) Consequences of Unapproved Remuneration Payments 
 
 The force of the binding nature of shareholders’ revised say on pay lies in the provisions that 
prohibit companies from making remuneration and loss of office payments to directors that are 
in breach of their approved directors’ remuneration policy.67  
 Contractual arrangements that contradict the policy will only be binding if the relevant 
payment is specifically authorized by way of a shareholder resolution, to be based on a 
memorandum setting out the amount and particulars of the proposed payment.
68
 An obligation 
to make a payment that would be in contravention of these provisions has no effect. Such 
payments are held by the recipient on trust for the company or other person making the 
payment, and any director who authorized the payment is jointly and severally liable to 
indemnify the company on whose behalf the payment was made for any loss resulting from it.
69
 
 Special rules apply in the context of control transactions. If a payment for loss of office is 
made in contravention of the approved directors’ remuneration policy to a director of a quoted 
company in connection with a transfer of shares in the company, or in a subsidiary of the 
company, resulting from a takeover bid, the payment is held by the recipient on trust for persons 
who have sold their shares as a result of the offer made. In such cases, the expenses incurred by 
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the recipient in distributing that sum amongst those persons shall be borne by the recipient and 
not retained out of that sum.
70
 
D. AN APPRECIATION OF THE 2013 REFORMS 
1. Goals, Costs, and Benefits 
 
 Stating its expectations for the latest reforms, the Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills suggested that, based on the extended three-year horizon for remuneration policies, the 
new rules would encourage companies to take a longer-term strategic approach. In addition, the 
Government’s expectation is that increases in transparency and shareholder influence will lead 
to greater and more efficient shareholder engagement and lower monitoring costs for 
shareholders. These factors, combined with reductions in capital costs and share volatility for 
companies, should improve firm performance.
71
 At the same time, the Government expects the 
additional requirements to carry little additional costs, as it believes that expenses would be 
transitory in nature and that the changes are in line with existing best practices.
72
 
 Whether the new framework will result in the envisaged changes is as of yet an open 
question. Nevertheless, the Government’s analysis of both costs and benefits may well be overly 
optimistic. The Government’s own final impact analysis, which considered costs and benefits of 
the new regulations, does not provide meaningful guidance in this respect. Noting that while 
‘the benefits to business and shareholders as a result of pay schemes being better designed and 
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more closely aligned with performance are considered to be significant’, the analysis also states 
that the relevant costs and benefits of shareholder votes on directors’ remuneration proposals 
‘are not currently monetisable.’73 
 In terms of costs, however, even if it turns out that – after a phase of transitory costs – there 
are no additional and longer-term direct monetary expenses, companies will have less flexibility 
as compared to the previous regime. Remuneration committees cannot make any extraordinary 
awards that are not in line with it remuneration policy without prior shareholder approval, 
making it more difficult to attract or retain the most sought after board members and managers. 
Perhaps the effect of this is part of the desired “dampening” of pay levels, but it remains a 
potentially serious threat that should be acknowledged and monitored closely. 
 On the benefits side, one question is whether the changes in disclosure rules will have the 
desired effects. Greater transparency will likely only be felt by institutional investors and their 
adviser, as readily conceded by the Government.
74
 Whether the differences in data and structure 
of reported remuneration information will ultimately have any significant and positive 
consequences is doubtful. Given the criticisms pointing to the potentially negative impact of 
increased disclosure it even seems possible that the reforms may have the opposite effects of 
what was intended, thereby facilitating higher pay levels.
75
 
 
 
 
 
73 
BIS, “Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ERR) Bill: final impact assessment (IA)” (2012) 5 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/enterprise-and-regulatory-reform-err-bill-final-impact-assessment> 
accessed 17 September 2014. 
74
 BIS, supra n 71, para 73. 
75
 See n 40 above and accompanying text. 
UK Executive Compensation 
 
22 
2. The Effects (and Wisdom) of Say on Pay 
 
 Another major question flowing from the 2013 reforms is the effect of binding shareholder 
votes on remuneration. The reputational factor inherent in advisory votes – coupled with other 
formal and informal tools available to shareholders, such as the right to appoint and dismiss 
directors – may already have influenced boards to some extent. Thus, making say on pay votes 
binding would not result in major changes.
76
 Additionally, if shareholder behavior under the 
previous regime is any indication, we should not expect to see continuing and substantial 
resistance, in the form of withheld shareholder approvals, in the near future – at least not after 
an initial phase during which the novelty of these votes may act as a stimulus on shareholder 
engagement. Based on studies of advisory say on pay, the best result to hope for is that 
shareholder votes will act as a mitigating factor on excessive or ill-designed pay on a case-by-
case basis, albeit without a broader impact on overall remuneration levels.
77
 
 Still, a survey of over forty large companies, conducted before the reforms came into effect, 
indicated that there was a trend towards salary freezes and bonus freezes or reductions for 
executive directors in 2013, while any planned increases were estimated to be lower than in 
previous years.
78
 Although many companies indicated planning to change the design of pay and 
incentives, ultimately only 15% of the respondents thought that executive pay would be more 
than 10% lower in their companies over the next three to five years, with the majority expecting 
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pay to stay at current levels and 25% of the respondents estimating that pay would rise within 
this timeframe by 10% to 25%. Thus, should these early reactions be indicative of future trends, 
the goal of lowering salaries seems unlikely to be met as a consequence of the new regime. 
 More fundamentally, reliance on shareholders to fix pay and other corporate governance 
issues is highly questionable. UK institutional investors have so far not proven to be willing to 
act as pro-active and engaged stewards,
79
 not to mention that they normally pursue their own, 
short-term oriented goals.
80
 Additionally, insofar as institutional shareholders rely on proxy vote 
advisors, shifting power to shareholders means shifting power to these advisory firms, raising a 
host of new accountability and conflict of interest issues.
81
 At the same time, individual 
shareholders, even if willing to act, remain constrained by the well-known issues stemming 
from collective action problems, information asymmetries, and rational apathy.  
 Thus, the executive remuneration debate goes to the heart of the corporate governance 
debate between board centrists and shareholder primacy proponents, which revolves around the 
perennial question of who should be in charge of the company. While this controversy is beyond 
the scope of this article, a more narrower point may be noted here: Corporate governance 
proposals should be mindful of the fact that shareholders are among those thought to have 
contributed to the financial crisis, even prompting the European Commission to state that 
“confidence in the model of the shareholder-owner who contributes to the company’s long-term 
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viability has been severely shaken”.82 Giving these same shareholders, with their proven 
appetite for risk and quick profits, more power may lead to increased pressures on boards to 
justify their pay with short-term gains, eviscerating the thrust of ongoing efforts to curb short-
termism.
83
 
3. Business As Usual or Boardroom Revolution? 
 
 Not surprisingly, the industry feels that the new regulatory environment makes the UK a less 
attractive place to come and work. However, an interesting question flowing from this 
proposition is whether being less attractive for the executives who only respond to the absolute 
highest financial incentives is, in the long-term, such a bad thing. The public often asks why 
executives cannot do an equally good job with lesser but still high pay, fueled by other than 
solely monetary rewards but led by intrinsic motivation.  
 Indeed, although incentives are an established part of executive pay packages, the Kay 
Review questioned whether it is necessary or appropriate to pay directors bonuses at all, given 
that they are not common in certain other professions that including high levels of 
responsibility, without there being serious concerns as to whether they are making the maximum 
effort.
84
 Indeed, bonuses, as they are used today, only work for executives if share prices – and 
thus profits – continue to perpetually increase. Since risk and returns are related, and companies 
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cannot endlessly sustain growth based on a given level of risk, it is not difficult to make the 
connection between excessive risk and remuneration.
85
 
 This leads us to the heart of the weaknesses of the current reforms. Having decided – 
whether correctly or not – that executive pay is in need of repair and a suitable area to be singled 
out for regulatory intervention, the Government should have taken more decisive and visionary 
steps. Instead, it opted to stay largely within the orthodox approaches to govern through 
‘therapeutic disclosure’ of corporate information and reliance on (partly non-binding) 
shareholder action, attempting to fix what has been declared a serious problem with 
comparatively minuscule and unimaginative measures. 
 Transparency has been dialed down, by giving in to pressures that a direct comparison 
between CEO and firm performance should be removed. Similarly, clawback or “malus” 
mechanisms, which would allow companies to require executives to pay back amounts already 
received under an incentive scheme or reduce awards based on a firm’s underperformance, have 
been omitted from the 2013 reforms.
86
 However, these measures would address the issue of 
asymmetric elasticity between pay and performance, in particular if they would be extended in 
order to allow reductions not only in bonus awards but also base salaries.
87
  
 Alternative measures that could have been taken – assuming again that executive pay 
represents an instance of market failure – include the Swiss model of separate shareholder votes 
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on base salary and bonus plans and a complete prohibition on paying exit payments. Moreover, 
other recent ideas for curbing excessive executive remuneration include measures such as 
curbing financial disclosure requirements, removing remuneration disclosure, prohibiting 
performance-based pay,
88
 controlling salary by using pay ratios and remuneration caps,
89
 or 
increasing employee and other stakeholder participation in the remuneration setting process.
90
  
 Whether or not these measures are appropriate is an open question. Yet, given the 
Government’s self-declared goals and ambition in the area of executive pay, its incremental 
approach with repackaged old proposals and small tweaks is hardly working. Thus, a decision 
has to be made: Does the Government, and society at large, wish to let companies continue with 
business as usual, letting them set executive pay as they see fit, which – justifiably or not – tends 
to result in higher pay, or should there be substantial changes in this area? If the latter is the 
goal, what is needed are decisive steps, much closer to a boardroom revolution than what we 
have seen thus far. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
Companies in the UK have shown little sign of making voluntary adjustments to executive pay. 
After decades of operating under a hybrid system of voluntary and mandatory practices and 
regulations, the UK Government’s latest set of reforms has changed and heightened disclosure 
requirements and introduced a mandatory, binding shareholder vote on directorial remuneration 
policies. Whether the case for regulatory intervention has been made, is unclear. However, if we 
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accept that there is such a case, the newly introduced reforms seem weak at best. In short, the 
latest UK framework represents a lukewarm attempt to fix something that may or may not be 
broken. 
